Whitney needed a new opportunity-any opportunity. But, more important, he needed credit-credit to save Miller and Whitney from bankruptcy, credit to enable him to fight for his rightful profit and for his good name lost in the cotton gin suits. When he heard that the Congress was "about making some appropriations for procuring Arms etc. for the U.S.," here was a heaven-sent opportunity.6 This would at least keep his manufactory going until he could get his cotton gin rights. The opportunity was so great and Whitney's situation so desperate that he was willing to promise "ten or Fifteen Thousand stand of Arms," a fantastic proposal! Whitney even promised to begin delivering "in a short time " and he "will come forward to Philadelphia immediately...." New hope for a desperate man! Why was such a rash proposal not rejected at once by such prudent men as President Adams and Timothy Pickering, the Secretary of War? The failure of the Pinckney mission had caused public concern, and French privateers were rumored to be off the coast. Even Washington was called out of retirement to head the armed forces. On the 4th of May 1798 Congress voted $800,000 for the purchase of cannon and small arms. When on the 24th of May Whitney arrived at the seat of government the plum was not only ripe and juicy but begging to be picked. Public sentiment was aroused, and the highest officials must do something-and that right promptly. Both sides could not close the contract quickly enough. Only the Purveyor of Public Supplies, Tench Coxe, seems to have kept his head-"I have my doubts about this matter and suspect that Mr. Whitney cannot perform as to time."7 It is not necessary to see "influence" at work here, though it is true that Whitney did have a number of Yale graduates who could help him. Much less is there any evidence that the generous terms of Whitney's contract grew out of the feeling that he had been shabbily used in his cotton gin suits. But he clearly had a personal friendship with Jefferson arising out of the patent for the cotton gin.
Certain features of the contract deserve closer examination. The legend makes much of the fact that the actual document was wholly handwritten. It says that all the other contractors of this time received printed contracts, and that there was therefore something special about Whitney's contract. Unfortunately an examination of the actual contracts, including Whitney's, in the National Archives shows that this was by no means the only handwritten contract-there were others, such as that of Owen Evans of Providence, Penn. The fact is that several of the early contracts were handwritten; the later contracts, mostly signed in September, were printed forms. These other contracts, printed or handwritten, were all identical in wording and provisions with Whitney's, except in the terms of the last paragraph. There was something special about Whitney's contract-it contained a paragraph six not included in any of the others. It was this paragraph that was crucial for Whitney. Having quickly sized up the situation in which the high officials found themselves, the shrewd Whitney saw his chance, consulted Baldwin as to the form the contract should take,8 and at one stroke solved all his immediate problems. This paragraph reads: " 6th. Five thousand dollars shall be advanced to the party of the second part on closing this contract, and on producing satisfactory evidence to the party of the first, that the said advance has been expended in making preparatory arrangements for the manufacture of arms, Five Thousand dollars more shall be advanced. No further advances shall be demanded until One thousand stands of Arms are ready for delivery, at which time the further sum of Five thousand dollars, shall be advanced. After the delivery of One thousand stands of arms, and the payment of the third advance as aforesaid, further advances shall be made at the discretion of the Secretary of the Treasury in proportion to the progress made in executing this contract. It is however understood and agreed by and between the parties to this instrument, that from time to time, whenever the party of the second part shall have the second thousand ready for delivery he shall be intitled to full payment for the same, so with respect to each and every Thousand until he shall have delivered the said Ten thousand stands."
Here was credit at last! Here was financial standing which assured further credit! Five thousand dollars at once, and five thousand more on terms which could be easily fulfilled by using his cotton gin laborers and machines. And assured payment for each thousand stands of arms upon delivery-to a total of $134,000. Little wonder that Whitney wrote to his friend Stebbins: " Bankruptcy and ruin were constantly staring me in the face and disappointment trip'd me up every step I attempted to take, I was miserable . . . Loaded with a Debt of 3 or 4000 Dollars, without resources, and without any business that would ever furnish me a support, I knew not which way to turn ... By this contract I obtained some thousands of Dollars in advance which saved me from ruin. "9 No wonder that in his eagerness to read paragraph six of the contract, Whitney evidently skimmed rapidly over the incredible terms of paragraph one.10 Whitney had contracted to deliver 4000 stands of arms by September 30, 1799, and 6000 more by September 30, 1800. Four thousand stands of arms in 15 months, from a factory yet to be built, and made by laborers as yet untrained, and by methods as yet unknown! And 6000 more in the following year! In his desperation Whitney had thrown all caution to the winds. He was no experienced manufacturer, as his deliveries of the relatively simple cotton gin indicate. He was aware that he knew nothing of arms making. And a prudent man would have expected at least some of the setbacks with which he fills his later letters to Wolcott, together with requests for further credit, contrary to the provisions of the contract. In short, despite his vague claims of new methods and what could be done by "Machinery moved by water," Whitney had only the vaguest idea of how he would actually fulfill the contract. He was not able to deliver even the first 500 muskets until September 26, 1801, and the contract was not actually completed until January 23, 1809. Further, the records of the Springfield Armory, now in the National Archives, show that even during the period 1815 to 1825, when his plant was fully established, Whitney never delivered muskets at the rate promised in his contract of 1798."
Not only have these facts been forgotten in estimating Whitney's motives in the contract, but also in attempting a proper evaluation of his troubles with Samuel Dexter, who had replaced Wolcott as Secretary of the Treasury. We are asked to see Dexter as a villain abusing our hero with "malice" by demanding that he perform in accordance with his contract. The other contractors of 1798 had in many cases failed to fulfill their contracts, and some of them had even gone into bankruptcy as a result of their efforts to manufacture arms for the federal government. But Springfield Armory records show that some of them had performed as contracted, a few on time and even more eventually. Yet these men had all ventured into arms making by financing themselves privately. There are no records of their writing the long apologetic letters full of troubles, promises, and requests for further advances, which characterize Whitney's correspondence from 1798 on. Nor had they been given the numerous informal extensions of time with which Wolcott, strongly under the influence of Hamilton's theories of the importance of manufactures, had favored Whitney and which culminated in a formal modification of the contract just before Wolcott left office. Whitney had been given more consideration than any other contractor.
But one might give at least a moment to the position of Dexter. He was a government official sworn to carry out the law and to protect the interests of the government. Whitney had been given every chance and had not performed. Some of the other contractors had. Even had Dexter seen the ultimate interests of the government in this matter in the broad terms that Wolcott and Jefferson did, he had no authority to make the extremely loose interpretation of Whitney's contract that Wolcott had. Actually Wolcott had left office partially as a result of other similar easy exercise of the discretions permitted his high office. Dexter did not deserve such blame.
And had Whitney, for his part, acted in good faith since 1801? We can leave out of our discussion the troubles Whitney so fully related in his numerous lengthy letters to Wolcott. They were real enough, even if recounted in rather unmanly fashion, but they were all of the sort, magnitude, and frequency which a prudent man would expect in an undertaking of this sort. And one could argue that if Whitney had been carelessly optimistic in what he had promised in the contract of 1798, so had the responsible government officials, who had also been warned by the Purveyor of Public Supplies to expect delay in delivery. However, despite Whitney's claims of the exhausting efforts and attention he had devoted to his arms manufacturing, the facts prove otherwise.
It is true that the lull in the affairs of Miller and Whitney from 1798 to 1801, plus the credit advanced him by the federal govern-ment, did enable Whitney to devote most of his time in these years to make a beginning on fulfilling his arms contract, and by September of 1801 he did deliver the first 500 muskets. But from this initial delivery until 1807 there is no twelve-month period during which he delivered over 1000 muskets. During this same period he had been given advances from the Treasury such that he was constantly in debt to the United States. In fact, when Whitney finally completed delivery in January 1809 he received a payment of only $2450 as final settlement of the total contract of $134,000. The later correspondence between Whitney and Roswell Lee, then superintendent at Springfield, although lacking technical details, strongly suggests that, contrary to Whitney's claims, at least a simultaneous development was going on. And there are patents, contracts, and accounts of Simeon North that strongly suggest that he, too, was using interchangeability in making his pistols as early as 1807. 18 John Hall begun work on his rifle designed to be made by interchangeable parts and on machinery to manufacture it prior to his patent of 1811 and was installing his methods and machines in the Harper's Ferry Armory by 1817. In 1827 Hall petitioned the government to give him adequate recompense for his contributions. This resulted in a series of commissions and investigations to establish the facts, by which he was finally compensated in 1840. The reports of these boards are matters of public record. The most significant for our purposes is one of 1827-two years after Whitneys' death.
" In making this examination our attention was directed, in the first place, for several days, to viewing the operations of the numerous machines which were exhibited to us by the inventor, John H. Hall. Captain Hall has formed and adopted a system of manufacture of small arms, entirely novel, and which, no doubt, may be attended with the most beneficial results to the country, especially if carried into effect on a large scale. A later report indicates that the machinery was especially desirable for it could manufacture " all other species of arms identically." This later report also shows that the machinery had been in use since at least as early as 1819 at Harper's Ferry: "At Harper's Ferry, and at Springfield, this machinery is believed to be exclusively used; and the money expended upon it, and upon the tools at the former armory from 1819 to 1834, both inclusive, was within a fraction of $150,000." The commission stated that since Hall was employed as an armorer at Harper's Ferry after 1819 he deserved no compensation in addition to his regular pay for improvements made after that date. But it recommended that he be compensated for the work he did from 1811 to 1819.20 All this can hardly be said to justify our legend's categorical statement " In every way Hall profitted by Whitney's work."
III MANUFACTURE BY MACHINERY
We have thus far taken the term "manufacture by interchangeable parts " to have a clear meaning, based upon Blanc's, Whitney's, and Hall's dramatic demonstrations in assembling arms out of parts taken at random. This is a concept based upon characteristics of the product. It of course raises the question of how closely the parts must fit to be interchangeable. The usual answer is that the tolerances allowed must be sufficiently small for the product to work as designed and no more, since closer tolerances will merely increase cost. But this is rather vague. A more significant concept of interchangeable parts results from an examination of the actual methods by which such parts are produced. In this sense modern interchangeable parts require these elements: (1) precision machine tools, (2) precision gauges or other instruments of measurement, (3) uniformly accepted measurement standards, and (4) certain techniques of mechanical drawing. We do not, of course, expect Whitney to have all these elements, but we can estimate the contribution he may have made by comparing his work to them. 21 In what sense were the Whitney firearms interchangeable? A test of a number of known Whitney arms in at least one collection proved that they were not interchangeable in all their parts! In fact, in some respects they are not even approximately interchangeable! 22 The answer to this paradox is to be found partly in the actual means of establishment of standards for their manufacture. Each of the contractors of 1798 (and the later contractors as well) was given two or three samples of the Charleville model of 1763, and his contract specified that these were to be followed exactly. This method meant that at best the output of one plant would be interchangeable, but the muskets of a given contractor would not necessarily be interchangeable with those of the other contractors. In short, our third and fourth elements of interchangeable parts-uniform standards of measurement, and working from adequately dimensioned drawings-were absent. In fact, they were not to appear for two more generations. 
This analysis of the Legend of Eli Whitney and Interchangeable
Parts raises more questions than it answers. We have by no means arrived at the truth about the legend, much less about the advent of manufacture by interchangeable parts. However, I hope it is clear that the whole question needs re-examination-a more critical analysis of presuppositions and of the evidence which is known, and a more careful search for other sources.
But why not let this nice convenient legend go on? Were it Whitney alone that concerns us, that might be well enough. But the issue is larger than that. The history of our industrial growth is of first importance to the understanding of our American heritage. That industrial development cannot be properly understood without careful consideration of its technological basis. Therefore the true story of the "Birth of American Technology " is of prime concern to us. We should make certain that the baby is perfect and legitimate.
